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Looking Ahead: October Term 2007
Glenn Harlan Reynolds*
Last year’s Supreme Court term was notable in at least one way:
It lived up to the prediction, made in this space last year by Professor
Peter Rutledge,1 that Justice Anthony Kennedy would solidify his
position as the ‘‘swing voter’’ on the court. Justice Kennedy found
himself on the majority side in every single 5-4 decision last term.2
Likewise, predictions that Chief Justice Roberts would move the
Court were borne out to a substantial degree.3
Nonetheless, changes in the Court tend to occur gradually—Harry
Blackmun, after all, initially voted with Warren Burger so often that
they were called ‘‘the Minnesota Twins,’’ but that was only at first.
Cases selected for the coming term may shed more light on where
the Court is likely to head in coming years, and provide some sense
of the kind of issues that the Court, or at least some of its members,
regard as particularly important. This all-too-brief Essay will look
at some of the highlights from next year’s docket. (Will predictions
made here turn out as well as those made by Professor Rutledge?
One can hope.) It will also discuss the Supreme Court’s diminished
caseload, the Court’s relationship with the courts of appeal, and the
implications of, and possible remedies for, this mismatch in output.
*Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee
College of Law. Thanks to Sybil Richards of the University of Tennessee Law Library
for the caseload numbers for the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.
1
Peter B. Rutledge, Looking Ahead: October Term 2006, 2005–2006 Cato Sup. Ct.
Rev. 361 (2006).
2
Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, New
York Times, July 1, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/
washington/01scotus.html.

David G. Savage, High Court Has Entered a New Era, Los Angeles Times, July
1, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/
washigntondc/la-na-scotus1jul01,1,4832858.story? (‘‘Working with a 5-4 majority,
Roberts prevailed in nearly all the major cases.’’).
3
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CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW
I. Free Speech and the Internet
Williams v. United States4 deals with the constitutionality of 18
U.S.C. §2252A(a)(3)(B), which prohibits knowingly advertising, promoting, presenting, distributing, or soliciting any material that
reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe,
that the material is illegal child pornography. The question before
the Supreme Court is whether this prohibition is unconstitutional
on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. A statute is ‘‘vague’’ if
its language is so unclear that a person of reasonable intelligence
cannot tell what it prohibits, opening the way to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. A statute is overbroad if it significantly
prohibits conduct that is protected by the First Amendment as well
as conduct that is not.
In an online chat room, defendant Williams had shared nonpornographic pictures of children—and adults digitally manipulated to
look like children—with an undercover federal agent. Williams
promised, but did not deliver, genuinely pornographic pictures of
children, and was charged with ‘‘pandering’’ under § 2252A(a)(3)(B).
Before the Eleventh Circuit, Williams argued that the statute was
overbroad and vague. The Eleventh Circuit found that it was, and
struck down the statute:
First, that pandered child pornography need only be ‘‘purported’’ to fall under the prohibition of § 2252A(a)(3)(B)
means that promotion or speech is criminalized even when
the touted materials are clean or nonexistent . . . In a noncommercial context, any promoter . . . be they a braggart,
exaggerator, or outright liar . . . who claims to have illegal
child pornography materials is a criminal punishable by up
to twenty years in prison, even if what he or she actually
has is a video of ‘‘Our Gang,’’ a dirty handkerchief, or an
empty pocket.5

The government’s justification was that shutting down a market
in child pornography requires banning all promotional speech,
regardless of whether it actually involves child pornography. The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that ‘‘the government may not

4
5

444 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1298.
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Looking Ahead: October Term 2007
suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.’’6
It added: ‘‘The Government must do its job to determine whether
illegal material is behind the pander.’’7 Since the statute bans ‘‘pandering’’ whether illegal material is present or not, the Eleventh Circuit found it overbroad and, hence, unconstitutional.
Williams’ vagueness challenge also received a friendly reception
from the court of appeals. The void-for-vagueness doctrine, the court
observed, exists for three reasons:
(1) to avoid punishing people for behavior that they could
not have known was illegal; (2) to avoid subjective enforcement of the laws based on arbitrary or discriminatory interpretations by government officers; and (3) to avoid any chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
Thus, to pass constitutional muster statutes challenged as
vague must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and provide
explicit standards for those who apply it to avoid arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.8

These concerns are heightened, it said, where a criminal statute
is involved, and where First Amendment rights are implicated, given
the greater danger of constitutional deprivations due to arbitrary
or discriminatory enforcement.9 And the court seemed to regard
§ 2252A(a)(3)(B) as rather obviously vague:
This language is so vague and standardless as to what may
not be said that the public is left with no objective measure
to which behavior can be conformed. Moreover, the proscription requires a wholly subjective determination by law
enforcement personnel of what promotional or solicitous
speech ‘‘reflects the belief’’ or is ‘‘intended to cause another
to believe’’ that the material is illegally pornographic.
Individual officers are thus endowed with incredibly broad

6

Id. at 1304 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002)).

7

Id.
Id. at 1305–06 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).

8
9

Id. at 1306.
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discretion to define whether a given utterance or writing
contravenes the law’s mandates.10

The appellate court imagined numerous examples of harmless
speech that might contravene the statute: ‘‘good pics of kids in bed,’’
or ‘‘little Janie in the bath—hubba, hubba!’’ as sent, along with
innocuous photos, by a grandmother. Such speech is not child pornography and is protected by the First Amendment. It thus found
the pandering provision void for vagueness.
The Williams case reaches the Supreme Court at a time when there
is increasing concern regarding illegal activities using the Internet,
and a general move toward increasing regulation of Internet activities.11 On the other hand, the most troubling cases involve real harm
to real children, at the hands of stalkers and pedophiles, rather
than the somewhat more rarefied harm addressed by the pandering
provisions of § 2252A(a)(3)(B).12 The Court’s disposition of the case is
likely to depend on whether a majority of justices regard Congress’s
effort to suppress the market for child pornography as sufficiently
important to justify some infringement of speech, and whether those
justices also regard the Eleventh Circuit’s view of the statute’s vagueness and overbreadth as compelling, or as exaggerated and subject
to control via case-by-case analysis. Playing into this analysis may
be the heightened power of law enforcement in the highly charged
area of child pornography cases, where an accusation may be nearly
as destructive as a conviction, as a reason for greater judicial strictness in statutory interpretation.
II. Dormant Commerce Clause
Despite calls from some academics, and even some members of
the Court,13 to lay the Dormant Commerce Clause to rest, it remains
10
Id. An interesting question: Since, to avoid vagueness, a statute must be understandable by people of ordinary intelligence, is a determination by judges that the
statute cannot be understood capable of being reversible error? Or is it inherently
self-validating? Or, alternatively, might we conclude that there are statutes that judges
cannot understand, but that are nonetheless clear to people of ordinary intelligence?

Neil Munro, Regulating Fantasy, National Journal, June 30, 2007, at 34.
Alexander Burns, Your Space, National Journal, June 30, 2007, at 32 (describing
predators’ use of the Internet to target underage victims).
11
12

See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
611 (1997) (Thomas, J. dissenting).
13
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alive. Existing doctrine forbids states from discriminating against
interstate commerce, or from regulating commerce in a way that
places an undue burden on interstate commerce. Kentucky Department of Revenue v. Davis may provide the next opportunity for the
Court to abolish or to reinforce the doctrine.
Davis involves a claim that Kentucky’s income tax system, by
exempting income from bonds issued by the state of Kentucky or
its political subdivisions from tax while taxing income from bonds
from other states, discriminated impermissibly against interstate
commerce. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that it did,14 and
the Kentucky Supreme Court denied review.
Noting that ‘‘state laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid,’’’15 the Kentucky
court held that the Kentucky statute was facially discriminatory and
hence invalid.
Though the case is in some sense one of first impression—no
case specifically addresses the exact same issue—the discriminatory
nature of the law makes the outcome seem rather unexceptional.16
That the Supreme Court granted certiorari, just one year after its
decision in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,17 however, suggests that
at least some of the justices wish to address the question of state
tax incentives on the merits, after dismissing Cuno on standing
grounds.18
One potential issue not raised in the opinion below or in the
petition for certiorari, but suggested in some prior Supreme Court
dissents, is whether the Dormant Commerce Clause result might be
reached via the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which prohibits
some forms of discrimination against out-of-state citizens. Previous
Davis v. Dep’t of Revenue, 197 S.W.3d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 562 (quoting Fultron Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996)).
16
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997)
(finding preferential tax exemption for in-state charities violative of the Dormant
Commerce Clause); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (striking down
ethanol sales credit limited to ethanol from Ohio or from states extending reciprocal
tax treatment to Ohio-produced ethanol).
14
15

126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
See Brannon P. Denning, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, State Investment Incentives, and the Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 2005–2006 Cato
Sup. Ct. Rev. 173 (2006) (discussing Cuno and Supreme Court Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine).
17
18
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Supreme Court caselaw has found that the imposition of higher tax
rates on nonresidents than on residents violates the Privileges and
Immunities Clause,19 which might well be extendable to the unequal
availability of tax exemptions as well. This is certainly not a case in
which the lower court can be said to be off the reservation, suggesting
that the Supreme Court’s willingness to grant certiorari involves a
desire to tinker with doctrine, not merely to correct an erroneous
interpretation below.
III. Presidential Powers
Can the president determine the steps necessary for states to take
in complying with U.S. treaty obligations? And are states bound to
honor treaty obligations of the federal government in implementing
their own criminal justice systems?
Those are the questions raised in Ex parte Medellin,20 in which a
Texas court found in the negative. This case may well prove to be
among the most important of the term, as it addresses core aspects
of the foreign affairs power and of federalism.
Jose Ernesto Medellin was a Mexican national convicted and sentenced to death for the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls
in Houston. After his appeals were completed, Medellin filed a
petition for habeas corpus claiming a violation of his rights under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.21
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides that foreign nationals accused of a crime shall have free access to consular officials
19
Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); see also Gillian E. Metzger,
Congress, Article IV and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468 (2007) (‘‘Congress’s dormant commerce clause authority is especially significant to congressional
power under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, given the overlap between the
activities to which both clauses apply. Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause
prohibits only state discrimination that affects nonresidents’ fundamental rights,
much of nonresidents’ economic activity falls into that category for Article IV purposes. Thus, invoking that clause the Court has struck down state laws that tax
nonresidents at rates higher than residents, charge nonresidents higher license fees
for engaging in commercial activities, and impose residency requirements as a prerequisite for certain forms of employment.’’) As Prof. Metzger notes, there is considerable
overlap between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, and this case may well fall within that area of overlap.
20

223 S.W.3d 315, 332 n.105 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 100–01, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292–93.
21
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from their home nation, that the accused shall be notified of these
rights, and that upon request the imprisoning state shall notify the
consular officials of the arrest or imprisonment.
After a somewhat complex procedural history, Medellin’s case
came before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In the interim,
however, the International Court of Justice had ruled in the Avena
case that the Vienna Convention confers individual rights, and that
the United States was in violation of the Convention.22 President
Bush responded by issuing a memorandum directing state courts
to give effect to the Avena decision.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was unmoved. Claims under
Article 36, it held, are subject to procedural default to the same
degree as other claims.23 In addition—and more importantly—the
presidential memorandum represented an unconstitutional usurpation of power on the part of the president:
We hold that the President has exceeded his constitutional
authority by intruding into the independent powers of the
judiciary. By stating ‘‘that the United States will discharge
its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in . . . [Avena], by having States courts
give effect to the decision . . . [,] the President’s determination
is effectively analogous to that decision. In Sanchez-Llamas,
the Supreme Court made clear that its judicial ‘‘power
includes the duty to ‘say what the law is.’’’ And that power,
according to the Court, includes the authority to determine
the meaning of a treaty ‘‘as a matter of federal law.’’ The
clear import of this is that the President cannot dictate to the
judiciary what law to apply or how to interpret the applicable law.24

In a lengthy discussion, the Texas court distinguished other cases
in which presidential foreign affairs power intruded into the realm
of the judiciary, and concluded that Medellin’s claims failed.
This case—and its tangled procedural history, which includes
both state and federal habeas corpus petitions and a previous Supreme
Court grant of certiorari that was dismissed as improvidently
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12 (Mar. 31).
22

23
24

Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 332 n.105.
Id. at 335 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Johnson, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006)).
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granted—illustrates the difficulty of integrating the national foreign
affairs power with the domestic operations of the states. It also
illustrates, as so many difficult cases in this realm do, the advantage
of legislation: A federal statute, spelling out the duties of state courts
in cases involving foreign nationals, would avoid the problems that
produced this case.
The case combines some interesting crosscurrents in the zeitgeist,
setting one theme in current international affairs and legal thinking—increased skepticism regarding executive powers—against
another: increased solicitude for foreign criminal defendants and
international law. With both federalism issues and questions about
the judicial and executive roles involved, it seems likely to produce
a plethora of opinions from various members of the Court regardless
of outcome.
IV. Criminal Law
When is a gun not a gun? When it’s the equivalent of money.
That is, sort of, the argument made by the defendant in United States
v. Watson.25
Watson was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which
criminalizes the ‘‘use’’ of a firearm during and in relation to drug
trafficking. The Supreme Court has previously held in Bailey v. United
States that ‘‘use’’ of a firearm means ‘‘active employment.’’26
Watson purchased a firearm for drugs. The unloaded firearm was
provided to him in exchange for OxyContin tablets. Unfortunately
for Watson, the purchase was part of a government sting operation,
and he was arrested. Watson entered a plea bargain, but reserved
the question of whether receiving an unloaded gun as payment for
drugs constitutes ‘‘use’’ of a gun in a drug transaction. The question
is whether the firearm’s role in this transaction is ‘‘active employment,’’ or whether it was merely a passive form of payment. This
is a subject on which the circuits are currently split.
The case itself is only moderately interesting, but the Court’s
handling of this question should shed some light on the interpretive
style of the Roberts Court and its new members. The statute seems
pretty clearly to have envisioned firearms ‘‘use’’ in a gun-slinging,
25
26

191 Fed. Appx. 326 (5th Cir. 2006).
516 U.S. 137 (1995).
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Miami Vice sense. On the other hand, the firearm was certainly used
here, but as payment. The ‘‘tough on crime’’ interpretation leaves
Watson in jail; the narrow, ‘‘rule of lenity’’ approach probably lets
him go free. The Court’s choices may prove revealing.
V. Habeas Corpus
In the cases of Al Odah v. United States27 and Boumediene v. Bush,28
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 barred habeas corpus actions by detainees. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari in April despite what many commentators
regarded as substantial tension with Rasul v. Bush.29 In a highly
unusual action, however, the Supreme Court reversed itself and
granted certiorari in these cases on June 29.30
Congress had responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which found the military commissions established
to try suspected terrorists unconstitutional, by passing the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which was intended to bar habeas corpus
claims by detainees.31 The questions presented are extensive:
Questions presented by Boumediene:
1. Whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, validly stripped federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by foreign citizens
imprisoned indefinitely at the United States Naval Station at
Guantanamo Bay.
2. Whether Petitioners’ habeas corpus petitions, which establish
that the United States government has imprisoned Petitioners
for over five years, demonstrate unlawful confinement requiring the grant of habeas relief or, at least, a hearing on the
merits.32
27
28

321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

542 U.S. 466 (2004).
According to Lyle Denniston, this may not have happened since Hickman v. Taylor
60 years ago. Lyle Denniston, Court Switches, Will Hear Detainee Cases, ScotusBlog,
June 29, 2007, at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2007/06/
court 1.html.
29
30

31

126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (No.
06-1195), available at 2007 WL 680794.
32
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Questions presented by Al Odah:
1. Did the D.C. Circuit err in relying again on Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950), to dismiss these petitions and to hold that
petitioners have no common law right to habeas protected by
the Suspension Clause and no constitutional rights whatsoever,
despite this Court’s ruling in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004),
that these petitioners are in a fundamentally different position
from those in Eisentrager, that their access to the writ is consistent with the historical reach of the writ at common law, and
that they are confined within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States?
2. Given that the Court in Rasul concluded that the writ at common
law would have extended to persons detained at Guantanamo,
did the D.C. Circuit err in holding that petitioners’ right to the
writ was not protected by the Suspension Clause because they
supposedly would not have been entitled to the writ at common law?
3. Are petitioners, who have been detained without charge or
trial for more than five years in the exclusive custody of the
United States at Guantanamo, a territory under the plenary
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, entitled to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of
liberty without due process of law and of the Geneva
Conventions?
4. Should section 7(b) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
which does not explicitly mention habeas corpus, be construed
to eliminate the courts’ jurisdiction over petitioners’ pending
habeas cases, thereby creating serious constitutional issues?33
The central issue is whether habeas corpus jurisdiction extends
to prisoners at Guantanamo, and whether Congress can strip away
that jurisdiction. The United States has taken the (somewhat implausible) position that the base at Guantanamo Bay is not within the
jurisdiction of the United States, and hence not within the territorial
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. This position was upheld by the D.C.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Al Odah v. United States of America, 127 S. Ct.
3067 (2007) (No. 06-1196), available at 2007 WL 671010.
33
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Circuit in Al Odah v. United States,34 and reversed by the Supreme
Court in Rasul v. Bush.35 Congress then passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,36 which barred habeas corpus jurisdiction by ‘‘any
court, justice, or judge.’’ The Supreme Court then held in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld 37 that the Detainee Treatment Act did not strip federal
courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction in pending cases. Congress
responded by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006,38 barring habeas corpus jurisdiction regarding aliens detained as enemy
combatants. In Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit held that this statute
barred habeas relief for Boumediene et al., and that it did not work
an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.
Some experts seem to think that a Supreme Court reversal is likely
in light of the Supreme Court’s sudden shift on certiorari,39 and that
seems plausible. There seems no reason to infer a sudden desire to
uphold the D.C. Circuit based on these actions. But while it seems
quite likely that the Court will overturn the D.C. Circuit, what rule
it will announce in doing so is unclear. While some commentators
have in the past argued that the U.S. government faces substantial
limitations under the Constitution even in its dealings with aliens
outside of United States territory,40 it seems unlikely that the Roberts
Court will abandon the principle of Verdugo-Urquidez41 to adopt such
an expansive rule. On the other hand, it seems reasonably clear that
Congress’s legislative intent was to bar such habeas petitions, and
the pas de deux engaged in by the Court and Congress thus far will
require a certain amount of fancy footwork on the part of the justices
if the result is not to look like a pure judicial power play—though
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
542 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2004).
36
Pub. L. 109–148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005).
37
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
38
Pub. L. 109–366, 120 Stat 2600 (2006).
34
35

This is extremely unusual, and it is probably a pretty good sign that a reversal
is likely. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Agrees to Take Guantanamo Bay Cases,
The Volokh Conspiracy, at http://volokh.com/posts/1183133554.shtml (June 29,
2007).
40
See, e.g., John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for the Application of Constitutional Limitations to Federal Action, 17 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 287 (1985).
39

U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (constitutional protections do not
extend to aliens who have not formed a ‘‘voluntary attachment’’ to the United States).
41
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this may be vitiated by the turnover in congressional control since
that legislation’s passage.
VI. Preemption
States are growing more enthusiastic about regulating tobacco,
but this sometimes creates conflict with federal law. That’s what
New Hampshire Motor Transport Association v. Rowe42 is about. Maine’s
Tobacco Delivery Law was designed to regulate direct-to-consumer
sales of tobacco via the Internet, etc., and made it illegal to knowingly
deliver tobacco products to a Maine consumer if those products
were purchased from an unlicensed seller. The effect of this rule
was to require carriers to treat tobacco products differently from
other products, making timely deliveries more difficult. Carriers
sued, arguing that these requirements were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).43
The FAAAA provides that a state
may not enact or enforce a law . . . related to a price, route
or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.44

Further, a state
may not enact or enforce a law . . . related to a price, route
or service of an air carrier or carrier affiliated with a direct air
carrier through common controlling ownership when such
carrier is transporting property by aircraft or by motor
vehicle.45

Package delivery services like UPS are covered by these provisions, raising the question of whether the Maine provision ‘‘related
to a price, route, or service.’’ Both the district court46 and the court
of appeals for the First Circuit held that it did.47

42
43
44
45
46
47

448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006).
Pub. L. 103–305, § 601, 108 Stat. 1569, 1605 (2006).
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2007).
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(A) (2007).
New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n v. Rowe, 377 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2005).
448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006).
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The State of Maine argued before those courts that the FAAAA
was intended to preempt only economic regulation, and not regulation based on the state’s police powers. This argument has a certain
force, but also offers the potential for a drastic narrowing of FAAAA
preemption, since state police powers are virtually boundless.
Maine’s argument also stresses that caselaw on FAAAA preemption
is based on cases involving preemption under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and that the scope of ERISA
preemption has since narrowed. The First Circuit found this argument unpersuasive, but perhaps the Supreme Court will feel differently. Its treatment of this issue, at any rate, is likely to shed light
on the Roberts Court’s general views on statutory construction and
state-federal relations.
VII. Right to Keep and Bear Arms
This year’s wild-card case is one that, as of this writing, is not
even on the certiorari docket.48 But it is a case that, in some ways,
may actually be more influential if the Supreme Court doesn’t get
around to hearing it.
The case is Parker v. District of Columbia,49 a D.C. Circuit case
involving the District’s draconian anti-gun laws. The result—an
individual rights decision striking down those laws—was unusual.
The Supreme Court has said little on the Second Amendment since
its opinion in United States v. Miller, 50 which left things rather
unsettled,51 and court of appeals caselaw on the meaning of the
Second Amendment was for many years rather shallow and conclusory. 5 2 More recently, there have been some signs 53 that
48
Indeed, as I write this, the petition for certiorari has not been filed, but such a
filing is expected. See Lyle Denniston, Second Amendment Case Headed to Court,
ScotusBlog, July 16, 2007, at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/
2007/07/second amendmen.html.
49
478 F.3d 370 (2007).

307 U.S. 174 (1939).
For more on the Miller opinion, see Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds,
Telling Miller’s Tale, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 113 (2002).
50
51

52
Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite be Trusted? Lower Court Interpretations
of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 961 (1996).
53
See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding an
individual right to arms under the Second Amendment).
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the circuit courts are taking notice of new scholarship54 suggesting
an individual right to arms under the Second Amendment, but not
much action in terms of striking actual federal firearms laws.
In Parker, however, the D.C. Circuit faced something that other
courts had not—a federal law, avoiding any questions of incorporation posed by state laws, and one that went well beyond any conception of mere ‘‘reasonable regulation,’’ as the District’s gun law effectively prohibited private ownership and use of firearms.
The District of Columbia’s attorneys argued that the Second
Amendment protected only a right to bear arms while actively serving in a state militia, a right that would leave no private conduct
protected, leading the D.C. Circuit to observe: ‘‘In short, we take
the District’s position to be that the Second Amendment is a dead
letter.’’ After an extensive review, the D.C. Circuit concluded that
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to arms, and
that such a right includes a right to own handguns, and that the
District of Columbia gun laws in question infringed that right.
For gun-rights advocates, Parker was a big win, as was the D.C.
Circuit’s denial of en banc review. As this is written, the Supreme
Court has not yet docketed a petition for certiorari in this case,
though it is likely that one will be filed: A loss for the District of
Columbia in the Supreme Court would be a major defeat for backers
of gun control, since it would mean that every gun control law
would be subject to some degree of constitutional scrutiny. Though
many gun control laws would undoubtedly withstand any degree
of scrutiny likely to be imposed by the Court, merely having to
acknowledge the constitutional issue would complicate matters considerably, and the more intrusive forms of gun control might well
be found unconstitutional. Concern about these consequences is
probably why the District of Columbia took so long to make a
decision on filing for certiorari that it was forced to ask for an
extension of time.55
See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment,
62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461 (1995); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the
Personal Right to Arms, 43 Duke L.J. 1236 (1994). See also David B. Kopel, What
State Constitutions Teach about the Second Amendment, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 827 (2002).
54

55
See Second Amendment Case Headed to Court, supra note 48. (‘‘[The] petition
would have been due Aug. 7, but city officials said Monday that they would ask
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., for a 30-day extension of time to file the case.’’).
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How likely is that? Experts as eminent as Laurence Tribe and
Mark Tushnet disagree:
Tushnet believes that if the Court grants certiorari, it will
ultimately overturn the decision of the D.C. panel. ‘‘My gut
feeling is that there are not five votes to say the individualrights position is correct,’’ he says. ‘‘[Justice Anthony] Kennedy comes from a segment of the Republican Party that is
not rabidly pro-gun rights and indeed probably is sympathetic to hunters but not terribly sympathetic to handgun
owners. Then the standard liberals will probably say ‘collective rights.’’’
But Tribe is less confident of that prediction. Should the
case reach the Supreme Court, he told The New York Times,
‘‘there’s a really quite decent chance that it will be affirmed.’’56

Supreme Court vote counting is a perilous business, but I don’t
see five clear votes to sustain Parker. On the other hand, I was
surprised by the outcome in the D.C. Circuit, and Laurence Tribe’s
skills at Supreme Court vote counting certainly exceed mine.
The legal commentariat seems to regard this as an important case,
with Mike O’Shea suggesting that Parker might overshadow the rest
of the Court’s caseload in the coming term:
It’s not often that the Supreme Court takes up the core meaning of an entire Amendment of the Bill of Rights, in a context
where it writes on a mostly clean slate from the standpoint
of prior holdings. If the Court takes the case, then October
Term 2007 becomes The Second Amendment Term. Parker
would swiftly overshadow, for example, the Court’s important recent cert grant in the Guantanamo cases.
How many Americans would view District of Columbia v.
Parker as the most important court case of the last thirty
years? The answer must run into seven figures. The decision
would have far-reaching effects, particularly in the event of
a reversal . . . there is a way more straightforward comparison that a whole lot of average Americans would be making.
That’s a comparison between the Court’s handling of the

56
Elaine McArdle, Lawyers, Guns and Money, Harvard Law School Bulletin, Summer 2007, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/alumni/bulletin/2007/
summer/feature 3.php.
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enumerated rights claim at issue in Parker, and its demonstrated willingness to embrace even non-enumerated individual rights that are congenial to the political left, in cases
like Roe and Lawrence. ‘‘So the Constitution says Roe, but it
doesn’t say I have the right to keep a gun to defend my
home, huh?’’57

O’Shea suggests that the pressure that this case might bring may
encourage the Court to deny certiorari rather than face such a comparison. Of course, the calculus on these issues may vary among
individual justices, and there are likely to be consequences to not
granting certiorari as well.
Should the Supreme Court wind up hearing this case, it will be
an interesting test of the power of academic legal thought. Second
Amendment caselaw is sparse, and many of the opinions are unenlightening. On the other hand, there is a comparatively large body
of legal scholarship on the Second Amendment, with most—though
by no means all—of it tending toward supporting the reasoning and
outcome in Parker. In the absence of precedent, it will be interesting—
and, to some law professors, perhaps humbling—to discover how
much impact this scholarship has on the Supreme Court’s thinking.
VIII. Taking it Easy: The Supreme Court’s Workload
One trend that has not shown any alteration since the appearance
of the Roberts Court is the Supreme Court’s reduced caseload. In the
past term, the Supreme Court produced 68 decisions after argument,
plus four summary opinions, for a total of 72 decisions on the merits.58 This number of 68 decisions after argument is the lowest in the
Court’s recent history, with the previous year seeing 71. By contrast,
October Term 1990 saw 106 decisions on the merits, a number that
itself was lower than the Court’s output in the 1970s: in the 1973
term, the Court produced 129.59
57
Mike O’Shea, The Second Amendment Term?, Concurring Opinions, at http://
www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/07/the second amen 1.html.

ScotusBlog, figures at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/
Workload.pdf.
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59
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Marbury’s Mixed Messages, 71 Tenn. L. Rev. 303 (2004).
I make a similar point in this piece, but as Mike Graetz once told me, you have to
say something three times in print before anyone pays attention. This is number two.
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By contrast, the caseload of the federal courts of appeal, whose
work is nominally supervised by the Supreme Court, has skyrocketed. In 2006, the federal courts of appeal produced 34,580 decisions
on the merits.60 In 1973, by contrast, the courts of appeal produced
a mere 777 decisions on the merits.61 A Court that decided 129 cases
on the merits could plausibly oversee a system of inferior courts
that decided 777. But can a Court that decides 68 cases on the merits
plausibly oversee a system that decides 34,580? Perhaps it can, if the
federal judicial system is running like a piece of perfectly functioning
machinery, with a failure rate of a fraction of one percent. I will
leave it to the reader whether that is a plausible account of the
current situation. My own feeling, however, is that it is not, which
is why I characterized the Supreme Court’s supervision as nominal.
Indeed, although—as the habeas cases above demonstrate—the
Supreme Court is capable of overseeing a court of appeals closely
on occasion, it seems that the federal courts of appeal may in some
cases exercise control in the other direction. The Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in Lopez and Morrison, for example,
seems to have succumbed to foot-dragging by the courts of appeals,62
leading ultimately to retrenchment and a ‘‘false dawn’’ of federalism.63 Like a puma with a herd of buffalo, the Supreme Court may
pick off the occasional outcast or straggler, and perhaps encourage
the herd to stick more tightly together, but it is not in a position to
choose the direction the herd will take tomorrow, or even to halt
a stampede.
To be fair, the enormous expansion of the courts of appeals’ caseload has probably contributed more to the Supreme Court’s limited
ability to exercise any real supervision than has the Supreme Court’s
own unwillingness to hear more cases. And the problem has gotten
60
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
cgi-bin/cmsa2006.pl.

See Reynolds, supra note 59.
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?,
2000 Wis. L. Rev. 369; Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and
Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts,
55 Ark. L. Rev. 1253 (2003).
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Ilya Somin, A False Dawn for Federalism: Clear Statement Rules After Gonzales
v. Raich, 2005–2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 113 (2006).
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bad enough that the Judicial Conference of the United States has
begun to take a hand in trying to resolve circuit splits over statutory
interpretation.64 There have also been proposals to create a National
Court of Appeals that would sit between the circuits and the
Supreme Court,65 though this is a cure that would likely dilute the
Supreme Court’s powers further.
What remedy is appropriate is beyond the scope of this Essay,
which has already run long enough. But the vast growth of the court
of appeals’ caseload relative to that of the Supreme Court leads to
conclusions that may be uncongenial in the context of this Essay,
and this journal: It may be that the Supreme Court doesn’t matter
as much as it once did. Statistically, the odds that any particular
court of appeals decision will reach the Supreme Court are negligible.
Nor, as the Lopez-Morrison example illustrates, do Supreme Court
precedents necessarily trickle down to affect decisions in the circuits.
For the vast, vast majority of litigants, the court of appeals is the
Supreme Court, in effect.
The glamour attending the Supreme Court tends to obscure this.
But while everyone focuses on the Supreme Court, the real and in
almost all cases effectively unreviewable power is exercised by the
courts of appeals. That power is less controversial because it is
exercised less often in ways that make waves: like good bureaucrats,
the courts of appeals tend to avoid controversy, and to make their
output sufficiently boring that few will bother to read it in search
of the controversial bits anyway.
One response to this—and one that I certainly endorse—is to start
paying more attention to lower courts. Unfortunately, it is not clear
who besides the legal academy will be willing to do so, and it is
not at all clear that the legal academy has any great interest in doing
so either. Court of appeals scholarship is not booming in tandem
with the caseload.
Another response is to pay far more attention to the confirmation
process where appeals court judges are concerned. The political
system has done just that in recent years, of course, and although
Jacob Scott, Article III En Banc: The Judicial Conference as an Advisory Intercircuit
Court of Appeals, 116 Yale L.J. 1625 (2007).
64

65
See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals: Report to the United States Congress and the Judicial Conference of the
United States 75–83 (1993).
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this has sometimes been portrayed as the creeping politicization of
a process that was once less politicized, it turns out to make a good
deal of sense: As the decisions of the courts of appeals become less
and less subject to a realistic possibility of review, the question of
who is making those decisions assumes much greater importance.
Yet another response—one likely to be more effective than the
others, if it can be implemented—is to remedy the caseload explosion
at the circuit court level. That explosion since the early 1970s is no
doubt the product of many causes, but the ‘‘regulatory explosion’’
that came with the expansion of federal power under the Commerce
Clause and the creation of new federal regulatory agencies like
OSHA and EPA, and the accompanying rise in interest groups
intended to lobby and influence them, undoubtedly played a major
role.66 It is probably just not possible for the Supreme Court to police
a judicial system that itself is big enough to police a government as
big as the federal government has become in the past half century
or so. Reducing the extent of federal responsibilities, and returning
them to a scope that more closely resembles the Framers’ intent,67
would likely also reduce the caseload of the federal courts to something more manageable.
Such a change would be far more than a judicial reform, of course,
and I see no great likelihood of its occurring any time soon. I hope,
however, that I am wrong, as I doubt that the Supreme Court, in
any plausible incarnation, can provide meaningful review over a
judicial system as busy as the one we have now. That does not make
the Supreme Court’s docket less interesting, perhaps, but it does
suggest that it is less important than is generally believed.

Jonathan Rauch, Demosclerosis: The Silent Killer of American Government 50–57
(1994) (describing the rapid explosion of interest groups as a function of expanding
government authority beyond traditional limits).
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For more on this topic, see Glenn H. Reynolds, Kids, Guns, and the Commerce
Clause, Cato Policy Analysis No. 216 (Oct. 10, 1994).
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